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1 INTRODUCTION**
From an EU political perspective the result of the
Brexit referendum was, without doubt, the most sig-
nificant event of 2016. Although the United Kingdom
(UK) has not yet formally triggered the process of
leaving the EU at the time the seminar took place,
Brexit is clearly set to have a major impact on both the
UK and the EU.
The consequences from a customs and VAT per-
spective will depend on the conditions negotiated for
Brexit and the future relationship between the UK and
the EU. Will the parties, for example, opt for the
Norway model for the Switzerland model or for the
Turkey model? Or will it be a unique, tailor-made
agreement? What are the implications of the various
models from a legal, trade and indirect tax perspec-
tive? Will the rules on the free movement of goods
continue to apply? And what about the rules and
regulations on competition and state aid?
During the seminar the three main speakers discussed
the various exit models and possible answers to the
above questions. These discussions were followed by a
lively panel discussion, led by Han Kogels1 and examin-
ing the implications of Brexit from a corporate, and
particularly multinational, perspective.
The seminar was chaired by René van der Paardt2 and
attended by over 200 participants from more than 10 EU
Member States.3
2 NEXT STEPS AND SCENARIOS FROM A LEGAL
PERSPECTIVE?4
The first speaker was Fabian Amtenbrink,5 who set the
scene by emphasizing that the rapid pace at which
events had unfolded since the Brexit referendum cur-
rently made it very difficult to predict how the legal
relationship between the UK and the EU would be
shaped post-Brexit.
Amtenbrink began by presenting a few facts to the
audience. Remarkably, the first time the UK held a
referendum on membership of what is now the EU was
back in 1975, just two years after the country had joined
what was then still the European Communities.
Although this earlier referendum was won by the
‘Remain camp’, various parallels with the recent Brexit
referendum can nevertheless be drawn, including the
fact that the geographical spread of Remain and Leave
voters was largely the same as back in 1975.
The UK parliamentary elections of 7 May 2015 were
won by the Conservative Party, partly because of a pro-
mise by the then prime minister, David Cameron, to
hold a referendum on Brexit. Prior to the referendum
Cameron negotiated a ‘new settlement’ for the UK within
the EU, with the idea being, as Amtenbrink explained,
that Cameron, as the leader of the Remain campaign,
could claim that these negotiations had significantly
improved the UK’s position and that there was therefore
no reason to leave the EU. On 23 June 2016, however, it
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was those voting Leave who came out on top, achieving a
51.9% majority on a turnout of 72%, in the non-binding
referendum. According to Amtenbrink, the Leave voters
were primarily driven by socio-economic factors affect-
ing parts of England and Wales and which those voters
attributed to EU legislation and the various freedoms
associated with EU membership. In reality, however,
these socio-economic factors were attributable to politi-
cal measures, or a lack of them, in the domestic eco-
nomic and political arena. As a result, Leave voters are
highly likely to be disappointed by what Brexit means in
practice. Meanwhile the referendum has also triggered
fresh debates about the constitutional position within the
UK of Scotland, for example, where the majority voted to
remain in the EU.
In the first few weeks after the referendum, neither
the UK nor the EU – still shell-shocked by the result –
gave any indications of the positions they planned to
adopt in the negotiations. All that changed, however,
on 14 October 2016 when the President of the
European Council, Donald Tusk, made the EU’s position
clear, saying that ‘The only real alternative to a hard
Brexit is no Brexit.’ In a speech on 17 January 2017,
Theresa May, who had by then succeeded Cameron as
UK prime minister, announced her intention to sign a
‘Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement’ with the EU.
Amtenbrink saw this as giving some indication on the
negotiating position to be adopted by the UK.
The new position of the UK vis-à-vis the EU will
clearly have an impact on businesses, residents and the
economies of both the UK and the EU, while Brexit will
also have consequences for the EU budget. With regard
to the latter, Amtenbrink pointed out that the UK is
currently the largest net financial contributor to the EU
budget after Germany and France. The question, there-
fore, is whether the EU budget will be reduced post-
Brexit or whether other EU countries will have to
increase their contributions? Owing to the lack of infor-
mation on this, and also the lack of insight into exactly
what Brexit will mean financially, this question cannot
be answered until we know what the position of the UK
will be after it leaves the EU.
Amtenbrink went on to explain, using a flow chart,
what the process of exiting the EU by triggering Article
50 TEU (‘Article 50’) will entail. Article 50 will be
triggered by the EU’s receipt of formal notification
from the UK of the latter’s intention to withdraw from
the Union. It is only after receipt of such notification
that negotiations on ‘the arrangements for its withdra-
wal, taking account of the framework for its future
relationship with the Union’6 can begin. From this
Amtenbrink concluded that, as well as agreeing on
withdrawal arrangements, the UK would also have to
reach a second agreement during the negotiations on
the shape of future trade and other relations with the
EU. As the UK will cease to be regarded as a member of
the EU two years after sending the notification under
Article 50, irrespective of whether agreement on with-
drawal has been reached in the meantime, Amtenbrink
sees prime minister May’s plan to send formal notifica-
tion at the end of March 2017 as highly ambitious, not
least given that, in practice, it consistently takes far
longer than two years to negotiate trade and other
such agreements.
Amtenbrink then outlined the possible scenarios for
future relations between the UK and the EU. The first
option would be for the UK to join the European
Economic Area (EEA). Although May’s previously men-
tioned speech would seem to suggest that the UK has
rejected this option, Amtenbrink believed ruling this
option out at this stage to be premature. He noted,
however, that membership of the EEA required accept-
ing the principle of free movement of persons and that
this could prove to be a stumbling block, given that
opposition to this freedom had been one of the reasons
driving those who voted for Brexit. Membership of the
EEA also requires acceptance of the principles of the
internal market, as well as the associated policy mea-
sures. Similarly, EEA members have to interpret EEA
measures that are identical to EU legislation in accor-
dance with the relevant Court of Justice (CJEU) case law.
A disadvantage of that scenario, from the UK’s perspec-
tive, is that the UK would no longer be able to influence
decision-making within the EU. Additionally, it would
have to become a member of the European Free Trade
Association (EFTA). This option, however, would give
the UK autonomy on its agriculture and fisheries, trade,
and defence and security policies, while it would also no
longer be part of the EU customs union.
A second option would be a tailor-made agreement
between the UK and the EU in the form, for example, of
a Stabilisation and Association Agreement, an Economic
Partnership Agreement, a Partnership and Cooperation
Agreement or a trade agreement. Amtenbrink drew the
audience’s attention to the fact that some of these EU
agreements are designated as ‘mixed agreements’ and
that these are difficult to negotiate, given that the EU
shares competences in these policy areas with the indi-
vidual Member States. In other words, such agreements
may have to be ratified both by national and regional
parliaments in all the individual Member States.7 For
that reason, too, Amtenbrink regarded the idea of nego-
tiating any of the above agreements within the two-year
timeframe as highly ambitious.
Lastly, Amtenbrink referred to the third option – a
‘hard Brexit’ – as the fallback scenario, and one in which
6 Art. 50(2), TEU. After the this contribution had been accepted,
May sent the formal notification on 29 Mar. 2017.
7 An example of this is CETA, the trade agreement between Canada
and the EU that was approved by the European Parliament on 15
Feb. 2017 and now has to be ratified by no fewer than thirty-four
national and regional parliaments.
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the UK would revert to the World Trade Organization
(WTO) rules. The question then arising, he said, is
whether and, if so, to what extent the WTO rules will
automatically apply to the UK after it leaves the EU.
3 BREXIT: CONSEQUENCES FOR VAT?
The second speaker, Thierry Charon,8 addressed the
VAT consequences of Brexit. As he explained, there are
two options available to the UK in the event of a hard
Brexit. Firstly it could revert to the UK Value Added Tax
Act of 1994, with adjustments to align the VAT system
more closely with UK domestic and foreign policy. These
adjustments could include different exemptions and
reduced rates or, for example, VAT exemptions being
replaced by zero rating. According to Charon, however,
it would be advisable to mirror EU legislation in this
respect to minimize differences between VAT systems
and avoid the possibility of double or no taxation.
Secondly, the UK could opt to dismantle its VAT system
and possibly replace it by another form of indirect tax.
Charon commented in this respect that closer ties with
the US could result in the VAT system being replaced by
a sales tax (or similar form of tax).
If, despite May’s stated intention, the UK opts for mem-
bership of the EEA/EFTA, this will not have any impact on
the UK’s VAT system, given that the EEA Agreement and
EFTA Treaty do not contain any provisions on taxation. In
this scenario, the VAT system (if retained) would be subject
only to the discrimination prohibitions.
If it is decided to opt for a tailor-made agreement,
Charon explained, it was unlikely that this would extend
to the VAT system. He considered it conceivable from a
legal perspective, however, that the UK would seek to
remain part of the EU VAT territory and would, there-
fore, not be regarded by the EU as a third country for
VAT purposes.9 Examples of countries currently enjoy-
ing that status include Monaco and the Isle of Man.
As Charon sees it, a continental partnership is not a
likely scenario, although he noted that various organiza-
tions lobbying on behalf of business seemed to be pro-
moting cooperation along such lines. In this scenario it
would be possible for the EU and UK to pursue an
intensive form of economic cooperation at an intergovern-
mental level, while also allowing sensitive issues such as
the free movement of persons to be excluded. In all the
above scenarios, the legal framework for VAT would also
be dependent on other international treaties and agree-
ments, as well as on how customs law is applied and on
various economic restrictions and opportunities.
Charon went on to highlight various practical conse-
quences that could create opportunities or, indeed, addi-
tional administrative burdens for businesses. These
include intracommunity supplies being treated as
imports and exports, with the rate to be levied, the
applicable border formalities and the audit procedures
being aligned with customs legislation of a more strin-
gent nature. The disadvantages of this route include the
ending of the right to apply the simplified procedures for
‘ABC supplies’, as well as cash-flow consequences if VAT
on imports cannot be reverse-charged. On the other
hand, a benefit would be that the conditions for applying
a 0% VAT rate would be more straightforward and
simply align with the export return.
Charon then addressed the issue of Business-to-
Consumer supplies, stating that the European
Commission may have to reconsider its proposed
amendments to the place of supply in response to
Brexit. This is because once the proposed amendments
and Brexit take effect, a UK enterprise will be able to
submit a single, centralized return for all cross-border
supplies to end users. Given that this opportunity is not
available to entities established in the EU, UK enterprises
or enterprises established in another third country would
be in better position than EU enterprises. This would
then discourage them from becoming established within
the EU. Charon made the same point with regard to the
Mini-One-Stop-Shop (MOSS) scheme10 and the plans
presented in the VAT Action Plan11 for the OSS,12 access
to which is denied to an EU enterprise, but will be
available to a non-EU enterprise.
Charon also explained that the procedures for VAT
refunds will then no longer be governed by Regulation
2008/9/EC,13 but instead by the Thirteenth Directive.14
The procedures under the latter are known for being
slow, which is disadvantageous from a company cash-
flow perspective. He also referred to some practical VAT
consequences of Brexit, specifically differences in the
interpretation of terms such as ‘immovable property’
8 Thierry Charon is a Professor in VAT Law at HUBrussel, a partner
at Loyens & Loeff, chair of the European VAT Club and a member
of the European Commission’s VAT Expert Group.
9 Art. 7, Council Directive 2006/112/EC of 28 Nov. 2006 on the
common system of value added tax, OJ L 347, 11 Dec. 2006,
1–118.
10 The Mini One Stop Shop (MOSS) scheme simplifies the system
applying to businesses that are liable for VAT in various EU
Member States and that, in principle, would otherwise have to
file separate VAT returns in each of these Member States.
11 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament,
the Council and the European Economic and Social Committee on
an action plan on VAT: Towards a single EU VAT area – Time to
decide (European Commission), Brussels, 7 Apr. 2016, COM
(2016) 148 final.
12 One Stop Shop (OSS) comprises an expansion of the MOSS
scheme, which is currently available only for providers of telecom-
munication, broadcasting or electronic services to consumers.
13 Council Directive 2008/9/EC of 12 Feb. 2008 laying down detailed
rules for the refund of value added tax, provided for in Directive
2006/112/EC, to taxable persons not established in the Member
State of refund but established in another Member State, OJ L 44,
20 Feb. 2008, 23–28.
14 Thirteenth Council Directive 86/560/EEC of 17 Nov. 1986 on the
harmonization of the laws of the Member States relating to turnover
taxes – Arrangements for the refund of value added tax to taxable
persons not established in Community territory, OJ L 326, 21 Nov.
1986, 40–41.
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that could arise between the UK and the EU after Brexit.
Interpretation differences could potentially cause con-
flicts relating to the place of supply of services and
thus, in certain circumstances, give rise to double or no
taxation. Other consequences could include greater dif-
ficulty in obtaining a VAT identification number and the
need to appoint a tax representative, with all the admin-
istrative formalities that this would entail. Double or no
taxation could also arise with regard to the application of
the fiscal unity rules. Will, for example, the judgment in
Skandia15 be followed strictly or not? Another significant
question is whether the doctrine established in the FCE
Bank case16 will be abandoned in respect of the head
office/permanent establishment relationship? And will it
be decided to align with the Swiss system? Here, too, the
choice to be made by the UK could potentially result in
either double or no taxation.
Charon gave a number of examples of opportunities
for the UK to remain attractive, from a VAT perspective,
at the financial heart of Europe. These include the pos-
sibility for UK enterprises to provide advisory services to
pure holding companies registered in Luxembourg. Such
services are currently liable for UK VAT, without any
right of deduction for the holding company. After Brexit,
however, such services will not be liable for either UK or
Luxembourg VAT. The application of ‘actual use’ rules in
certain countries, including the Netherlands, mean,
however, that this opportunity would not be available
in these other countries. And that, according to Charon,
could distort the business climate for holding compa-
nies. Other examples include the increase in the VAT pro
rata. Charon referred in that respect to the wider appli-
cation of Article 169(c), VAT Directive,17 given that EU
enterprises would be entitled to deduct exempt transac-
tions involving supplies to UK customers. Equivalent
application of this Article in UK VAT legislation would
also create a benefit for financial services providers with
high volumes of transactions with customers established
outside the UK. Similar (positive) consequences for the
pro rata would also be available to enterprises providing
interest-bearing loans. If an EU enterprise were to grant
such a loan to a UK enterprise, the former would also
have the right to partially deduct VAT on general and
direct costs.
4 BREXIT: CONSEQUENCES FOR CUSTOMS
AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE?
The third speaker, Walter de Wit,18 began by outlining
the existing framework, in which the UK is a member of
the EU customs union. The benefits of this membership
include the absence of customs duties and formalities
within the union. Another characteristic feature of a
customs union is a common customs tariff on external
transactions. Currently, therefore, the UK is not allowed
to set its customs tariffs independently, just like it is not
permitted independently to enter into free trade agree-
ments. In both cases, these are competences reserved for
the EU. In the event, however, of a hard Brexit, the UK
would no longer retain access to the internal market.
Instead, its relationship with the EU would be based on
the WTO rules, as is currently the case for the EU’s
relationships with, for instance, the US, China and
Japan. It is also possible, however, that the UK and the
EU could negotiate a free trade agreement.
Whatever the case, the UK will be a third country in
all the above scenarios. Goods exported from the UK to
the EU will consequently be subject to customs formal-
ities, while UK enterprises currently playing a distribu-
tion role for the EU will no longer enjoy the benefits of
preferential agreements that the EU has concluded with
third countries or measures that it has introduced uni-
laterally. This is because one of the conditions in these
agreements or unilateral measures is that the relevant
goods should have been transported to the EU directly
from the country to which the EU has granted prefer-
ential treatment. Goods that are first transported to the
UK will fall foul of the requirement for direct transport
and so may lose the right to favourable treatment when
imported into the EU. Although possible solutions are
available, De Wit emphasized that these have not always
worked in practice.
If the WTO scenario materializes, imports will be
subject to ‘Most Favoured Nation’ tariffs. In principle,
then, the EU will apply ‘normal’ duties to imports from
the UK, and vice versa. Preferential treatment will be
available only if a free trade agreement or a customs
union is agreed. In addition, the UK will no longer
have access to the free trade agreements that the EU
has signed with third countries. After leaving the EU,
the UK will obviously, however, be able to sign free trade
agreements with third countries if it wishes. De Wit
mentioned, in this regard, that an absence of free trade
agreements would hit certain sectors, including the auto-
motive industry, particularly hard.
If a post-Brexit customs union is agreed on by the UK
and the EU, a common customs tariff will apply, with
the UK simply having to accept the rate set by the EU
and having no independent say in the matter. This will
also apply to any preferential treatment and free trade
agreements; there, too, the UK will not be able to act
15 CJEU 17 Sept. 2014, C-7/13 (Skandia America Corp. (USA), filial
Sverige), ECLI:EU:C:2014:2225.
16 CJEU 23 Mar. 2006, C-210/04 (FCE Bank), ECLI identifier: ECLI:
EU:C:2006:196.
17 Directive 2006/112/EC, Council Directive of 28 Nov. 2006 on
the common system of value added tax, OJ L 347, 11 Dec. 2006,
1–118.
18 Walter de Wit is a board member of EFS and programme director
of the Post-Master in EU Customs Law at the Erasmus University
Rotterdam, as well as Professor of International and European
Customs Law at the Erasmus School of Law and a partner at EY,
where he is a member of EY Nederland’s Global Trade team.
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autonomously and will simply have to follow the policy
set by the EU. Furthermore, customs formalities will
continue to apply, as in the relationship between the
EU and Turkey. It is also very much the question as to
whether such a customs union would extend to agricul-
tural products. These products are not included in the
customs union agreed between Turkey and the EU;
instead, the trade regime applying to agricultural pro-
ducts transacted between the two parties is covered by a
special decision.19 As De Wit pointed out, this regime
provides for less favourable treatment than the agree-
ment underlying the customs union, given that agricul-
tural products are subject to the ‘no drawback rule’.20
In her speech, prime minister May implied that
imports in certain sectors should receive favourable
treatment. Indeed, the UK seems even to have given
undertakings to specific sectors in this respect. May has
also said that she will be working hard to find partners
and agree free trade agreements with them. As she put it,
‘I’m a promoter of free trade, I believe in free trade.’
Being in a customs union would mean the UK would
not be able to set customs tariffs and enter into free trade
agreements autonomously. The question arises, there-
fore, as to whether a customs union is a probable sce-
nario. And De Wit stated that this, indeed, was unlikely
to be the case.
If the EU and the UK were to agree on a treaty
comparable to the EU-Canada Comprehensive
Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA), the UK would
retain the right to set its own customs tariffs. On the
other hand, customs duties between the UK and the EU
would be suspended or at least reduced. The UK would
also be able to decide for itself whether to enter into free
trade agreements with other countries. In this scenario,
the UK would additionally be entitled to apply bilateral
cumulation, whereby, in essence, products of EU origin
can be regarded as originating from the UK, providing
they are subject to further processing in the UK or are
incorporated into a product manufactured there.
Preferential import duties on goods of UK origin will
then be more likely to apply.
De Wit went on to share a number of ideas on Brexit
and possible scenarios with the audience. These included
his belief that, in view of the apparent contradiction in
May’s speech – no customs union, but instead
regulations very similar to such a union, it was possible
that the UK could seek to remain in the customs union
as an interim solution, and that the ‘real’ Brexit could
then relatively calmly be postponed, from a customs
perspective, for a further five years. The relationship
between the UK and the EU would then be replaced in
due course by a free trade agreement, while the UK itself
would then have the right to negotiate its own free trade
agreements. De Wit described the scenario in which the
UK would remain a permanent member of the customs
union as unlikely, given that the country would then
lack the control it wants to have. From that perspective,
he considered that a specific and special free trade agree-
ment between the UK and the EU was consequently
more likely to be the preferred route.
5 PANEL DISCUSSION
The final hour of the seminar was devoted to a panel
discussion led by Han Kogels, with Godfried Smit,21
Werner Engelen,22 Marlon van Amersfoort23 and Huub
Stringer24 as panel members. The audience also contrib-
uted enthusiastically and was keen to exchange views
with the panel. A number of the points raised are dis-
cussed below.
It is currently unclear as to what scenario will shape
the relationship between the UK and the EU, and indeed
between the UK and the rest of the world, in the years to
come. This makes it very difficult for businesses to
anticipate the UK’s forthcoming exit from the EU.
Companies are spending considerable time on business
impact studies and continuing to monitor tax develop-
ments, while also taking account of the possible impact
on IT systems and the prospect of additional adminis-
trative requirements. Tax departments are coming under
pressure, while the problem for IT departments is that
they like to know the changes needing to be made to
systems at least a year in advance, and executive boards
want to be presented with concrete solutions rather than
possible scenarios. The financial sector is heavily focused
on whether UK banks are going to lose their EU ‘bank
passport’.25 And on the question of whether banks will
leave ‘the City’? Another aspect of concern to businesses
is the free movement of persons, and specifically what
Brexit will mean in terms of employee migration rights
and companies’ ability to attract talent to the UK?
It is not only business that are having to anticipate
possible scenarios. Government authorities, too,19 Decision No 1/98 of the EC-Turkey Association Council of 25 Feb.
1998 on the trade regime for agricultural products – Protocol 1
concerning the preferential regime applicable to the importation
into the Community of agricultural products originating in
Turkey – Protocol 2 concerning the preferential regime applicable
to the importation into Turkey of agricultural products originating
in the Community – Protocol 3 on rules of origin – Joint declara-
tion concerning the Republic of San Marino – Joint Declaration,
OJ L 86, 20 Mar. 1998, 1–38.
20 Under the ‘no drawback rule’, parties are not permitted to make
simultaneous use of the benefits of special provisions for inward
processing and the favourable tariffs available under a preferential
measure.
21 Godfried Smit is the European Affairs Manager at EVO.
22 Werner Engelen is Head of Indirect Tax & Customs at Lego
Nederland B.V.
23 Marlon van Amersfoort is the EMEA-NL Indirect Tax Advisor at
Shell International B.V.
24 Huub Stringer is Head of VAT at ABN AMRO Bank N.V.
25 A banking licence issued in the UK allows products and services to
be offered throughout Europe. This situation will no longer apply,
however, if the UK ceases to be in the internal market.
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including ministries of finance, are having to make pre-
parations. What impact will Brexit have on the EU bud-
get? What obligations will the UK have to comply with –
despite Brexit – under existing agreements? What are the
tax implications – also from a legislative perspective –
and what about the regulatory landscape for financial
services providers after Brexit? These are just some of the
issues where government authorities are working with
businesses.
Another point arising during the discussions was why
Leave voters had been able to win a majority in the
referendum. Could it have been an extremely irrational
decision by angry citizens who felt their voices were not
being heard? And would matters have ever reached this
stage if it had been up to businesses to decide? Which
country will be the next to seek to leave? And is it now
too late to turn back the tide? It was claimed that the
political world seemed unaccountable and unresponsive
to issues that matter to ‘ordinary people’. Parallels could
also be drawn in this respect with the 2016 Ukraine
referendum in the Netherlands, where politicians were
also seen as being out of touch with the population.
Where, it was asked, are the politicians and representa-
tives speaking out in favour of the EU and highlighting
the benefits it has for citizens? Reference was made to the
campaign slogan used in the Netherlands in 2004–2006
to increase public awareness of the EU’s importance. The
slogan – Europa. Best belangrijk (or, in other words,
‘Europe: pretty important’) – was described as a clear
example of the lack of conviction in politicians’ efforts to
communicate a belief in Europe.
With regard to treaty application and the role of the
CJEU, the question remains as to what extent CJEU
judgments will remain applicable in a post-Brexit UK.
Possible breaches of EU law can obviously currently still
be submitted to the CJEU as the UK is still subject to and
part of the acquis communautaire. As part of its plans
leading up to Brexit, however, the UK government
intends to introduce the Great Repeal Bill to Parliament
during 2017. Once adopted, the Great Repeal Act will
transpose ‘European’ laws into national UK legislation.
From then on, breaches of EU law will no longer be able
to be brought before the CJEU and UK residents will no
longer enjoy the benefits of protection under European
law. Although the post-Brexit UK will in principle be
able to modernize its legislation as it sees fit, the question
is to what extent it will manage to do this and whether it
will adopt a competitive approach with regard to tax.
Can we, for example, expect to see a tax haven being
created off the coast of Continental Europe? According to
Kogels, this would be a very strange development, given
the efforts currently being undertaken to counter base
erosion and profit-shifting. Whatever happens, however,
‘It ain’t over till the fat lady sings.’
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